The Appropriateness of the Poolability Assumption for Multiproduct Technologies: Evidence from the English Water and Sewerage Utilities by Anna Bottasso et al.
TheAppropriateness of the PoolabilityAssumption
for Multiproduct Technologies: Evidence from the








© 2010 byAnna Bottasso, Maurizio Conti, Massimiliano Piacenza and Davide Vannoni.Any opinions
expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the Collegio CarloAlberto.The Appropriateness of the Poolability Assumption for Multiproduct Technologies: 




University of Genova, HERMES 
 
Maurizio CONTI 
University of Genova, HERMES 
 
Massimiliano PIACENZA 
University of Torino, HERMES, Ceris-CNR 
 
Davide VANNONI 




Abstract. The empirical literature on the cost structure of multiproduct firms (e.g., public utilities providing  
in combination gas, water, and electricity) traditionally assumes a common technology across different 
products and stages of production, letting the issue of poolability unexplored. The appropriateness of this 
assumption is tested here by estimating a General cost function for samples of UK specialized and sewerage-
diversified water utilities. The results show the existence of both aggregate scale economies and 
diseconomies of scope; more interestingly, the hypothesis that the two groups of water companies share the 
same technological parameters is rejected. Given the implications of this finding in terms of optimal industry 
configuration and possible restructuring policies (e.g., mergers and/or divestitures), our test suggests caution 
in pooling samples when undertaking empirical studies on data which refer to multiproduct technologies.  
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1 1. Introduction 
The empirical literature studying the cost structure of firms initially focused on single product-
single stage technologies (see, for example, Christensen and Greene, 1976, for electricity 
generation, and Tsionas and Loizides, 2001, for the railways industry). In subsequent 
developments, cost functions were allowed to accommodate for: 
-  multiple outputs (see, for example, Shin and Ying, 1992, and Christodoulopoulos, 1995, for the 
telecommunications industry), in order to investigate the presence and the extent of multi-
product (or horizontal) scope economies;  
-  multiple production stages, with the aim of measuring multi-stage (or vertical) scope economies 
(see, for instance, Kaserman and Mayo, 1991, for electricity generation and distribution).  
Finally, starting from the seminal work of Ivaldi and McCullough (2001), who estimated in the 
context of the US railways industry a cost function with three outputs at the downstream stage and 
one output at the upstream stage, scholars are now refining methodologies which, being capable to 
cope with multi product and multi-stage technologies, are particularly apt to investigate 
simultaneously on the presence of both scope and vertical integration interdependencies.  
The above cited studies addressed some very important policy issues, such as the optimal 
organization of network industries which have been recently invested by deregulation and 
liberalization waves. For instance, the finding of the exhaustion of scale economies beyond a 
certain size threshold for telecommunications firms suggested the breakdown of State-owned 
monopolies in order to promote more competition. To take another example, the empirical finding 
of the presence of vertical integration economies in the electricity industry is not judged sufficient 
to counterbalance the efficiency gains which are expected to emerge from increased competition, so 
that a deverticalization process is often advocated as an effective policy to contrast the dominant 
position of incumbents. In a similar vein, the existence and the extent of scope economies for multi-
utilities operating in gas, water and electricity services is a fundamental prerequisite for the policy 
debate about the unbundling of integrated operators into separate specialized entities.  
In order to address the above issues, the use of an integrated approach (Weninger, 2003; 
Piacenza and Vannoni, 2009), which specifies a shared empirical multiproduct cost function in 
which diversified and specialized firm data are pooled in order to estimate function’s unknown 
parameters, can be extremely useful. However, it relies on the maintained hypothesis of the 
existence of common structural properties across stages of production and, for each stage, across 
different products, a key assumption which can be too restrictive and may not be supported by 
empirical data. Rather surprisingly, but similarly to what happens in other areas of empirical 
analysis, the issue of poolability has been largely unexplored in the literature (see, for instance, 
2 Kapetanios, 2006). Electric utilities which are only active in the generation phase have been 
supposed to have the same production function of vertically integrated firms and pure distributors 
(Fraquelli et al., 2005). Similarly, multi-utilities active at different degrees in the gas, electricity 
and water sectors have been hypothesized to share the same technology (Fraquelli et al., 2004; 
Farsi and Filippini, 2009).  
The problem of heterogeneity between sub-samples of firms has been treated by introducing 
fixed-effects in regressions, by adopting panel data methods that account for unobserved 
heterogeneity (such as the random parameter models used by Farsi, et al., 2008) or by comparing 
estimates from the pooled sample with results stemming from sub-samples of specialized firms. In 
this paper we propose to address the poolability issue by estimating a general model which includes 
different vectors of parameters for different sets of firms, and by performing statistical tests to 
verify the similarity or dissimilarity of such parameters vectors. For such a purpose, we use data on 
a sample of firms, including the ten large water and sewerage companies (WASCs) and all the 
smaller water only companies (WOCs), active in the English and Welsh water and sewerage sector 
over the period 1995-2005.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly revises the relevant 
literature, while section 3  presents and discusses our empirical methodology. Section 4 illustrates 
the key characteristics of dataset used in the present study. Section 5 presents the main results of 
our regressions, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Previous work on the cost structure of the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry includes, 
among others, Stone & Webster Consultants (2004), who estimated both a total and a variable cost 
function using the translog specification and the generalized quadratic functional form. Their 
estimates, relative to the period 1993-2002, suggest that the joint production of water and sewerage 
services is likely to be characterized by diseconomies of scope. This result contrasts with that of 
Hunt and Lynk (1995), who, using data on the ten WASCs for the pre-privatization period, found 
evidence of cost complementarities in the joint production of water, sewerage and environmental 
services. More recently, Saal et al. (2007) estimated an input distance function for the ten WASCs 
over the period 1985-2000 and found evidence of decreasing returns to scale, a result that was later 
confirmed by Bottasso and Conti (2009a) who estimated a total cost function and found 
diseconomies of scale for the WASCs at the median sample point. Finally, Bottasso and Conti 
(2009b) estimated a variable cost function for the WOCs and found evidence of unexploited 
3 economies of output and customer density and small scale economies which were increasing with 
the level of population density.  
Another relevant issue which has been investigated in the empirical literature is the link 
between regulation and productivity/efficiency developments in the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industries. This issue has been considered, among the others, by Saal et al. (2007), who 
estimated a stochastic input distance function and found a constant level of inefficiency but positive 
technical change for the WASCs over the period 1985-2000 and by Bottasso and Conti (2009a, 
2009b) who found a positive rate of technical change for both the WASCs and WOCs. For a 
discussion and comparisons between parametric and non parametric frontier models, see Murillo-
Zamorano and Vega-Cervera (2001), for an application to electricity generation, and Resende 
(2008), for an application to US telecommunications. 
3. Empirical strategy 
The main goal of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on the technology of multi-
product firms by analyzing the cost function of both WASCs and WOCs, through separate 
regressions as well as through a pooled specification which includes separate parameters vectors for 
the two sub-samples.  
From a methodological point of view, we estimate a rather general functional form, i.e., the 
General specification of the Composite cost function model firstly introduced by Pulley and 
Braunstein (1992). The latter has been widely cited and recognized as particularly suitable for the 
analysis of multi-output firms, since it allows to better identify the existence of scope economies 
when a substantial fraction of the sample does not produce all outputs considered. In accordance to 
this, recent empirical research on different industries has shown that the Composite cost function 
model performs better with respect to other commonly used functional forms (e.g., the Translog 
model and the Generalized Quadratic model) and provides more precise estimates of cost 
economies measures (Piacenza and Vannoni, 2004). In spite of this fact, such specification has been 
rarely used as yet and has never been applied to the water and sewerage sector.  
Let us assume the following General cost function specification (PBG): 
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where c(y; p) is the long-run cost of production, yi and pr refer to outputs and factor prices, WA and 
WO are two types of firms in which the sample has been partitioned ( and record the values 
of the i
th output and of the price of the r
th input for WASCs and are zero for WOCs), the 
superscripts in parentheses φ, πWA, πWO and τ represent Box-Cox transformations. For example, in 
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By applying Shephard’s Lemma, one can easily obtain the associated input cost-share equations: 
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Equation [1] embraces several of the most commonly used cost functions. The Generalized 
Translog (GT) and the Standard Translog (ST) models can be easily obtained by imposing the 
restrictions φ = 0 and τ = 1 (and  WA π  =  WO π  = 0 for the ST model). The Composite specification 
(PBC) is a nested model in which  WA π  =  WO π  = 1 and τ = 0, while the Separable Quadratic (SQ) 
functional form requires the further restrictions δir = 0 for all i and r. 
  Since the empirical results can have important implications for the policy design and the 
regulation of network industries, we stress the importance of considering different functional 
forms, so that the policy maker can rely on robust findings. For example, Christodoulopoulos 
(1995), while investigating the presence of natural monopoly conditions in the Greek 
telecommunications sector, compared the results coming from ST and GT multi-product cost 
function models and found noticeable differences between them.  In a similar vein, Fraquelli et al. 
(2004) showed that measures of scale and scope economies where rather different across 
5 functional forms, with ST and GT specifications providing very unstable estimates when outputs 
were set near to zero. 
  In this paper we estimate the system [1]-[2] and carry out LR tests to select the model best 
fitting observed data. More interestingly, for the preferred model, the null hypothesis that there is a 
common parameter vector for WA and WO firms is tested again the alternative hypothesis that the 
parameters differ across sub-samples, by carrying out an LR test between a pooled specification 
versus an unrestricted one.  
The fully unrestricted model (which allows for different parameters for WOCs and WASCs) 
has also been estimated including, as it is common in the literature, a set of control variables which 
takes into account firms’ different operating conditions, such as the average pumping head, the 
proportion of water which is abstracted from rivers, the  proportion of large users, the fraction of 
population receiving at least secondary sewage treatment. Furthermore, to take into account the 
quality improvements that took place over the sample period, we have checked that our main results 
are unaffected by the inclusion of quality adjusted outputs obtained by interacting output variables 
with quality indexes.
1 
4. Data  
The dataset includes all the ten large water and sewerage companies (WASCs) and the smaller 
water only companies (WOCs) active in the English and Welsh water and sewerage sector over the 
period 1995-2005. Since the number of WOCs fell from 18 to 12 over the sample period, we end up 
with an unbalanced panel of 240 firm-year observations. When mergers took place between firms 
of similar size we considered the merged entity as a new firm entering the panel; on the other hand, 
if a merger involved companies with a considerable size differential we let the bigger survive. 
Finally, when a WOC was acquired by a WASC, we simply dropped the company from the sample.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables considered in this paper, disaggregated 
for WASCs and WOCs. 
Total costs (c) are the sum of labor, capital and other input costs, a residual category which 
includes materials, energy, services, etc. Outputs are the Megalitres/day of water delivered (yw) and 
the equivalent sewerage population (ys). Productive factors are labor (L), capital (K) and other 
inputs (O). Capital costs have been computed as the product of the capital stock and the price of 
                                                 
1 Quality in the water sector was proxied by the index Q1, which is defined as the ratio of the average percentage of 
each WASC’s water supply zones that are compliant with a set of key parameters, relative to the sample average in 
1995/96. Quality in the sewerage sector was proxied by the index Q2, the percentage of sewerage treatment works not 
failing with respect to minimum sanitation standards. The estimates of the baseline models are presented below, while 
the results of the more complete specifications are available upon request. 
6 capital, and deflated using the UK Construction Output Price Index. The capital stock has been 
proxied by the Modern Equivalent Asset estimation of replacement costs of net tangible assets, as 
reported in the regulatory accounts, but modified in order to take into account the periodic asset 
revaluations that occurred over the sample period. See Bottasso and Conti (2009a) for a detailed 
description of the methodology adopted.  The price of labor (pL) is given by the ratio of total 
employment expenses to the number of employees. The price of other inputs (pO) is obtained by 
dividing residual expenses by the sum of the km of sewerage and water mains. The price of capital 
(pK) has been calculated as the sum of the depreciation rate and the opportunity cost of capital 
capital, the latter computed as the actual nominal interest rate on ten years UK gilts (as a proxy for 
the risk-free rate of interest) plus the pre-tax regulatory premium less the tax benefit associated with 
debt financing (computed as the imputed tax-rate times company interest payments relative to the 
asset value). The regulatory premium is calculated on the basis of the assumptions adopted by 
Ofwat to set tariffs at the 1994 and 1999 price reviews and varies across companies (in particular, 
Ofwat’s determinations allowed for a higher regulatory premium for the small WOCs).
  The 
summary statistics reported in Table 1 reveal that the WASCs are on average much larger than the 
WOCS; moreover, both within WASCs and WOCs there is a considerable variability in terms of 
size, as reflected by the large standard deviations for the two output measures.  
The adoption of a cost function framework is particularly suitable when analyzing an 
industry characterized by the presence of several price regulated local monopolistic companies: in 
fact, given that both water and sewerage tariffs are set by the regulator and that operators are 
required to satisfy the demand, outputs can be safely considered exogenous. The facts that in the 
UK the use of metering is far from widespread, and water and sewerage tariffs are in practice a tax 
on the rateable values of properties, are reinforcing our assumption of outputs exogeneity. 
Furthermore, as the UK water and sewerage operators can be considered relatively small players in 
their respective input markets, also input prices can be considered exogenous. 
5. Estimation results 
All the specifications of the multi-output cost function are estimated jointly with the input cost-
share equations via a non-linear GLS estimation (NLSUR, which is the nonlinear counterpart of the 
seemingly unrelated regression technique developed by Zellner, 1962). In our three-inputs case, to 
avoid singularity of the covariance matrix of residuals, only the equations for labor (SL) and capital 
(SK) were retained in the system. Before estimation, all variables were standardized on their 
respective sample average values. 
7 A simple look at the estimates of Box-Cox parameters φ = 0.12, τ = 0.08,  WA π  = 0.47 and
 
WO π  = 0.30 suggests that the preferred model is the General Composite model (PBG). More 
rigorously, the likelihood ratio statistics on the system log-likelihoods of the different models 
invariantly lead to the rejection of the (nested) PBC, GT, ST and SQ models. Given the system log-
likelihoods of the four restricted models Lr, with r alternatively being PBC (LPBC = 1826.23), GT 
(LGT = 1821.82), ST (LST = 1814.19), SQ (LSQ = 1634.25), and the system log-likelihood of the 
unrestricted model, (LPBG = 1858.67), each LR test reads as follows:  
                                             LR = 2⋅[LPBG – Lr]         [3] 
The statistics is always positive, as the unrestricted model PBG must always have the larger 
likelihood, and it is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-square ( ) under the null hypothesis H0 of 
the validity of the restricted model, with degree of freedoms corresponding to the number of tested 
restrictions. The tests, which are reported at the bottom of Table 2, are clearly in favor of the PBG 
specification.  
2 χ
Turning now to the key issue of poolability which is the main focus of this paper, we can 
reject the null hypothesis H0 that the parameters are invariant to the type of firm. A close inspection 
at the estimates reported in the two columns of Table 2, in fact, reveals some remarkable 
differences. This is confirmed by the LR test, that compares the log-likelihood of the general model 
[1] with the one resulting from a restricted specification in which the cost function parameters are 
undifferentiated for WASCs and WOCs (LCOMMON). The LR test is: 
               LR = 2⋅[LPBG- LCOMMON]   [4] 
Comparing its value (LR=65.982) with the critical value of the Chi-square statistics ( = 19.675) 
leads to reject H0 and to retain the GENERAL SPECIFICATION. 
2
) 11 ( χ
The summary statistics show that the estimated models perform quite well, with a McElroy 
system R
2 which is beyond 94% for all specifications. Moreover, the models exhibit a good degree 
of satisfaction of both output and input price regularity conditions (at least for 94% of sample 
points). The estimates of cost elasticities with respect to the water output are 0.40 for WASCs and 
0.86 for WOCs, while the cost elasticity with respect to the sewerage output is 0.41. The estimated 
cost shares are 0.04 for labor and 0.87 for capital for WASCs (0.09 and 0.80 for WOCs), figures 
which are very close to the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1. 
For the average WASC firm, global scale economies and scope economies are respectively 
SE = 1.23, and SC = -0.27, where: 
= ) ; ( p y SE 1/∑
i
cyi ε                         [5] 
8 = ) ; ( p y SC [] ) ; , ( / ) ; , ( ) ; , 0 ( ) ; 0 , ( p y y c p y y c p y c p y c s w s w s w − +               [6] 
highlighting that there are increasing returns to scale and that costs of diversified firms are higher 
than the sum of costs of two utilities specialised in the water and in the sewerage sector, 
respectively.
 This latter result has important implications in terms of optimal industry configuration; 
in particular it suggests that in some European countries, such as Italy and UK, the existence of 
integrated water and sewerage companies may not be justified on the grounds of cost savings 
arguments, and therefore a better resource allocation could be achieved through regulatory policies 
promoting the separation between water and sewerage services. Similar results on scope economies 
between water and sewerage services have been found by Stone and Webster (2004). 
Tables 2 and 4 show that the results for the restricted model are qualitatively similar and 
point towards the presence of diseconomies of scope and weak increasing returns to scale. 
However, there are non trivial differences as far as the estimated cost shares and the measures of 
scale and scope economies are concerned. We have run also separate regressions for WASCs and 
WOCs, whose results are reported in Tables 3 and 4, which confirm quite sizeable differences in 
cost function parameters, cost shares and cost economies between the two types of firms. For a 
clear and meaningful comparison, notice that WOCs firms are only active in the water sector and 
are smaller than WASCs, which implies that the point of approximation at which scale and scope 
economies are computed refer to utilities of a smaller size for the former and of a larger size for the 
latter. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the cost structure of a sample of utilities active in the English and Welsh water 
and sewerage industry. From a methodological standpoint, we use the general specification of the 
Composite cost function model, which is tested against other popular functional forms, on the one 
hand, and we test the hypothesis that WASCs and WOCs share the same technology, on the other 
hand. The results of the LR tests confirm the merits of the PB-type cost functions and show for the 
average firm the existence of both aggregate scale economies and scope diseconomies. More 
interestingly, the hypothesis that the two groups of firms share the same technology is rejected (LR 
= 65.982, which is well above the critical value = 19.675).  
2
) 11 ( χ
While the pooling of specialized and (horizontally and/or vertically) diversified firms is a 
common practice in empirical investigations on cost structure and efficiency assessment of multi-
product utilities, the presence of heterogeneity among utilities suggests that a cost function with 
technological coefficients which are invariant across sub-samples of firms might be inadequate for 
9 a reliable analysis of cost properties of network utilities. The results of our simple exercise suggest 
to adopt a cautious approach which duly takes into account the possibility to relying on different 
functional forms and, for the preferred specification, to have a separate set of parameters for 
different sub-samples.  
This issue is particularly relevant for the analysis of public utility industries undergoing 
intense restructuring processes through mergers and/or divestitures policies (e.g., energy, railways, 
as well as water distribution utilities all around continental Europe), given the widespread welfare 
impact associated with these regulatory interventions. For instance, considering the UK water 
sector, some issues at stake are: 
- the consolidation of the industry, in order to increase the volumes and the scale of production; 
- the unbundling and/or breakdown of water and sewerage activities; 
- the economic assessment of mergers and acquisitions (especially between WASCs and WOCs), 
and the extension of local monopolies to new neighbouring areas; 
- the vertical integration or separation between distribution and upstream production phases. 
Our analysis provides hints and suggestions for all the above issues except the last one, and is in 
favour of a further consolidation of the industry, a process which should be however accompanied 
with the separation of water and sewerage activities.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Full sample  WASCs  WOCs  Variable 
Mean  St. Dev  Mean  St. Dev  Mean  St. Dev 
Volume water (yw)  529.6 573.6  1045.5  577.4  185.7 175.2 
Sewerage pop (ys)  2497.2  3913.3  6242.9  3859.6            0           0 
Total costs (c)  855.3 1130.8 1975.8  1043.3  108.4  97.0 
Labour share (SL)        0.064  0.024  0.043   0.011  0.078    0.020 
Capital share (SK)        0.827  0.048  0.877   0.024  0.794    0.027 
Other inputs share (SO)        0.109  0.032  0.080   0.017  0.128    0.023 
Labour price (pL)  25.6 4.4  27.3  4.9  24.5 3.6 
Capital price (pK)  10.3 1.5 9.4  1.0  10.9 1.4 
Other inputs price (pO)              0.0030              0.0008               0.0026      0.0006               0.0032                0.0008
Observations              240             96         144 
Volume water: ML per day of water delivered 
Sewerage population: thousands of equivalent people 
Total costs: thousands of UK £ 
Price labour: thousands of UK £ 
Price capital: percentage ratio 
Price other inputs: thousands of UK £ / thousands Km of water and sewerage mains 
13 14 
Table 2. NLSUR estimates of the General cost function [1] - Pooled  sample 
POOLED SAMPLE  
(GENERAL SPECIFICATION)     
POOLED SAMPLE  
(COMMON SPECIFICATION)        Regressor
a 
  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Box-Coxφ  0.119*** (0.024)  0.142*** (0.021) 
Box-Coxπ WA  0.473 (1.144) 
Box-Coxπ WO  0.298** (0.120) 
0.806*** (0.088) 
Box-Coxτ  0.083  (0.111)       -0.155  (0.126) 
Constant WA  1.489*** (0.185) 
Constant WO  1.746 (2.058) 
1.334*** (0.057) 
yw WA  0.521** (0.253) 
yw WO  0.287*** (0.046) 
0.650*** (0.121) 
ys WA  0.532*** (0.183)  0.593*** (0.080) 
yw
2 
WA  0.071 (1.197) 
yw
2 




WA     -0.226  (0.833)         -0.308** (0.150) 
yw ys WA  0.252 (0.799)  0.284 (0.117) 
lnpL WA  0.038*** (0.004) 
lnpL WO  0.086*** (0.007) 
0.039*** (0.002) 
lnpK WA  0.874*** (0.006) 
lnpK WO  0.798*** (0.007) 
0.875*** (0.003) 
lnpL yw WA  0.008 (0.014) 
lnpL yw WO     -0.001  (0.001) 
0.007*** (0.001) 
lnpK yw WA     -0.025  (0.023) 
lnpK yw WO  0.000 (0.001) 
     -0.017*** (0.003) 
lnpL ys WA     -0.008  (0.014)       -0.008*** (0.001) 
lnpK ys WA  0.026 (0.022)  0.018***  (0.003) 
lnpLlnpK WA     -0.026**  (0.011) 
lnpL lnpK WO     -0.021***  (0.006) 
     -0.023*** (0.004) 
lnpL lnpO WA     -0.003  (0.009) 
lnpL lnpO WO     -0.028***  (0.003) 
     -0.015*** (0.002) 
lnpO ln
 pK WA     -0.039***  (0.013) 
lnpO lnpK WO     -0.047***  (0.006) 
     -0.050*** (0.005) 
Observations    240    240 
System Log-likelihood  1858.670  1825.679 
McElroy system R
2        0.997        0.997 
LR test (PBG vs. PBC) 64.88***  - 
LR test (PBG vs. GT)  73.70***  - 
LR test (PBG vs. ST)  88.96***  - 
LR test (PBG vs. SQ)                   448.84***  - 
LR test (GENERAL vs. COMMON)  -      65.98*** 
aDependent variable: c = total cost of production. Levels of significance: ***1%,**5%,*10%. 15 
Table 3. NLSUR estimates of the General cost function [1] - Separated samples 
WASC SAMPLE (
 






Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Box-Coxφ       -0.767***  (0.181)  0.009  (0.072) 
Box-Coxπ WA  0.800*** (0.097)  -  - 
Box-Coxπ WO  -  -           -0.112**  (0.057) 
Box-Coxτ       -0.157  (1.652)  0.558***  (0.059) 
Constant WA  1.048*** (0.025)  -  - 
Constant WO  -  -        1.008***  (0.024) 
yw WA  0.540*** (0.169)  -  - 
yw WO  -  -        0.963***  (0.032) 
ys WA  0.332** (0.144)  -  - 
yw
2 
WA       -0.097  (0.677)  -  - 
yw
2 
WO  -  -        0.463***  (0.032) 
ys
2 
WA       -0.475  (0.760)  -  - 
yw ys WA  0.312 (0.442)  -  - 
lnpL WA  0.042*** (0.002)  -  - 
lnpL WO  -  -        0.074***  (0.002) 
lnpK WA  0.879*** (0.005)  -  - 
lnpK WO  -  -        0.794***  (0.002) 
lnpL yw WA  0.003 (0.007)  -  - 
lnpL yw WO  -  -            -0.001*  (0.001) 
lnpK yw WA       -0.008  (0.018)  -  - 
lnpK yw WO  -  -        0.001  (0.001) 
lnpL ys WA       -0.006  (0.008)  -  - 
lnpK ys WA  0.014 (0.016)  -  - 
lnpLl npK WA       -0.018*  (0.010)  -  - 
lnpL lnpK WO  -  -            -0.025***  (0.008) 
lnpL lnpO WA       -0.007  (0.008)  -  - 
lnpL lnpO WO  -  -            -0.028***  (0.004) 
lnpO ln
 pK WA       -0.046**  (0.019)  -  - 
lnpO lnpK WO  -  -            -0.039***  (0.006) 
Observations    96    144 
System Log-likelihood  754.931  1115.02 
McElroy system R
2      0.942        0.951 
aDependent variable: c = total cost of production. Levels of significance: ***1%,**5%,*10%. 
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Table 4. Cost properties estimates for pooled and separated samples (at the average values for 
outputs and input prices)
 a 
 
POOLED SAMPLE  
(GENERAL SPECIFICATION) 
POOLED SAMPLE  
(COMMON SPECIFICATION)  WASC SAMPLE (
 
WA) WOC  SAMPLE (
 
WO) 
Output elasticity        
εw WA  0.40 (0.21)  0.51 (0.15)   
εw WO  0.86 (0.08) 
0.47 (0.07) 
 0.96    (0.03) 
εs WA  0.41 (0.14)  0.42 (0.06)  0.31 (0.14)   
Economies of scale (SE ) 
and scope (SC )         
SEw,s WA  1.23 (0.22)  1.21 (0.07)   
SEw WO  1.16 (0.10) 
1.12 (0.06) 
 1.04    (0.03) 
SCw,s   -0.27 (1.02)  -0.34 (0.15)  -0.53 (0.66)   
Input cost-shares        
SL WA  0.04 (0.00)  0.04  (0.01)   
SL WO  0.09 (0.01) 
0.04 (0.00) 
 0.07  (0.02) 
SK WA  0.87 (0.01)  0.88 (0.02)   
SK WO  0.80 (0.01) 
0.88 (0.00) 
 0.79  (0.03) 
a Standard error in parenthesis. 
 
 